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INTRODUCTION
Summary of the McChesney-Nichols Argument
The question of “How to save Journalism?” is a front burner issue, as major
metropolitan dailies, like the Rocky Mountain News and the Philadelphia Inquirer implode.
Calls for bailouts have gone up even from critics of the industry, to save the jobs of
journalists, while the industry is calling for a further relaxation of limits on media ownership
so they can merger newspapers and television stations exemptions from the antitrust laws so
they can coordinate the availability of content online.
Before policy makers spend a lot of public money or weaken important public policies, we
should ask some tough questions. Why should we “save” “journalism?” What is the problem
with the newspaper business? Will saving newspapers save journalism? Will allowing
mergers solve the economic problem or improve the quality of content?
In The Death and Life of American Journalism 1 , McChesney and Nichols use a
framework they have applied for decades to develop an account of the current crisis in
journalism and the policy responses that flow from it that is dramatically different from the
dominant framing we hear in the media and public policy debates. 2 Their account commands
attention because it is grounded in a long-term, structural explanation of the secular decline of
journalism in America. 3
Death and Life argues that the seeds of disaster were sewn during more robust
economic times because of a misguided business model. Quality journalism was undermined
by the commercial, corporate business model that sought to squeeze high rates of profit out of
highly concentrated markets by pressuring variable costs – reporters – to produce more with
less. As the quality of the product declined, so too did the value of the business. Thus the
root cause of this decline is the concentrated, commercial mass media business model, not the
rise of the Internet or the advent of television.
As long as the business model was still robust, it was difficult to have a debate about
how this under-investment resulted in inadequate journalism, particularly in an age when a
belief in “market fundamentalism” 4 stressed economic success above all else. The media
sector was a particular target of market fundamentalism, symbolized early on by Mark
Fowler’s 1982 statement -- as Ronald Reagan’s first Federal Communications Commission
Chairman -- that “A TV is just a toaster with pictures” in an article entitled “A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation.” 5 Behaving like a toaster with pictures, even during
periods of economic expansion, the commercial mass media failed to invest adequately in
quality journalism. McChesney and Nichols argue that with the faith in market
fundamentalism recently shaken by the financial meltdown, the bursting of economic bubbles,
the collapse of the commercial mass media business model and other scandals 6 , the broader
issues of quality journalism can no longer be ignored. The account offered by McChesney and
Nichols must be confronted and a far reaching debate over quality journalism can begin.
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Purpose of the Paper
This paper seeks to elaborate on the McChesney-Nichols argument by offering a
broader analysis of market failure in the media sector. It adds several layers of conceptual
refinement and empirical evidence. We have elsewhere reviewed the large literature and
empirical evidence supporting this view. 7 McChesney and Nichols present a great deal of
new, qualitative evidence in their most recent book. The purpose of this paper is to sharpen
the conceptual framework, to provide key pieces of empirical analysis that demonstrate the
critical conceptual points and to provide a traditional framework that may be more familiar to
policymakers, which may enable them to recognize and become comfortable with the new
direction of policy that is necessary to ensure a robust journalistic sector henceforth.
In the next section, we refine the distinction between the role of the media in the polity
and the economy, elaborate on the causes and measurement of the failure of the 20th century
commercial, corporate mass media model, and distinguish between the role of the media as a
4th estate and a 5th estate. We then provide new data to reinforce the conceptual conclusions
above, as well as the earlier analysis of McChesney and Nichols. We include more precise
measures of the failure of the commercial mass media to invest in the journalism that society
needs and wants and an examination of the impact of the growth of digital media on the
commercial mass media. The conclusion integrates the conceptual and empirical discussions
as a framework for understanding the policy recommendations made by McChesney and
Nichols.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The Role of Journalism in Society
Industrial organization analysis traditionally starts with product and geographic market
definitions, but an under-appreciated aspect of this approach is to start with basic conditions. 8
“What exactly is the nature of the product being produced?” Here, the important point is that
the value of quality journalism lies in the polity, not the economy. The role of the 4th Estate is
to help to produce good government (see Figure 1). Quality journalism is the tool that it uses
to do so. Generally, this is accomplished by monitoring the other estates in society – political,
economic and social.
The Monitorial role is probably the most widely recognized and least controversial in
terms of conventional ideas about what the press should be doing, as seen by the press
itself, its audiences, and various sources and clients. It refers to all aspects of the
collection, processing, and dissemination of information of all kinds about current
and recent events, plus warnings about future developments. Some comment and
interpretation is appropriate 9
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Figure 1: Reinforcing and Expanding the McChesney/Nichols Case for Public Support for Quality Journalism

McChesney and Nichols launch their argument by noting that the Founding Fathers
were convinced of the importance of the press, so much so that they not only attested to its
importance in their writing -- memorialized it in the First Amendment -- but also favored the
press with massive subsidization of distribution costs in the early Republic. It was not until
much later that commercialization turned the press into the media and the tension between its
roles in the polity and its economic underpinning became apparent.
The core concept of the monitorial role involves the journalist as a neutral watchdog,
rather than a partisan participant, holding social, economic and political actors to account by
presenting facts rather than advocating positions and offering opinions. Journalists inform the
citizenry about the activity in the polity, the economy and society more broadly. This framing
places a spotlight on investigative journalism. Reporting is not just a recording of an
eyewitness account. It involves probing beneath the surface of that account, juxtaposing
inevitably conflicting accounts and editing the result into a coherent story. Although some
explicit editorializing, based on quality journalism, is part of the monitorial role, it is not just
an opinion either. There are always tensions, as journalists are humans and inevitably have a
perspective. Journalism tends to set the agenda based on what it devotes attention to. Quality
journalism does not claim that there is no perspective in the reportorial process. Rather, it
seeks to control the impact of this perspective.
Over the course of two centuries, this basic recognition of the social value of the press
beyond its economic value persisted. These concepts were expressed for the industrial age in
a seminal, antitrust case before the Supreme Court – the U.S. v. Associated press – in which a
dominant journalistic enterprise was challenged. Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence states the
proposition as forcefully as any:
Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts and potatoes. And so, the
incidence of restraints upon the promotion of truth through denial of access to the
basis for understanding calls into play considerations very different from comparable
restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial aspect. 10

Distinguishing the 4th Estate from the 5th Estate
While the monitorial role of the press has been the focal point of thinking, a secondary
role has been recognized – the participatory role.
The facilitative role… is not prominent in the literature… The theory of the public
sphere has also identified the media as an essential element. That theory refers
primarily to journalism that is deliberately practiced as a means of improving the
quality of public life and contributing to deliberative forms of democracy… It is
designed to widen access and promote active citizenship by way of debate and
participation. 11

We refer to this role as the 5th estate for ease of reference and because the concept is
being applied to the impact of the Internet on the contemporary media landscape. It is
generally hoped that monitoring society and informing the public will get them to act, but
mobilizing is a different kettle of fish. This type of activity predominates in cyberspace
because the medium is naturally suited to do this.
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More generally, the networks comprising the 5th Estate have two key distinctive and
important characteristics: 1. the ability to support institutions and individuals to
enhance their ‘communicative power’… by affording individuals opportunities to
network within and beyond various institutional arenas. 2. The provision of
capabilities that enable the creation of networks of individuals which have a public,
social benefit (e.g. through social networking websites). 12

Our use of the term “5th estate” has similarities and differences with the use Dutton
makes of the term above. We agree that the emergence of the 5th estate stems for the
dramatic expansion of access to information and the ability to communicate across
institutional and geographic boundaries. We disagree with the suggestion that the 5th estate
can supplant the 4th estate. Interestingly, the only other reference to the explicit use of the
term 5th estate that Dutton makes is to a web site that adopted the name. The web site
described itself as serious and satirical commentary and appears to be defunct (with no entry
after July 2009). This example underscores the two characteristics of the 5th estate that
distinguish it from the 4th estate. It is largely commentary and its durability over time at the
level of individual organizations is suspect. Others have argued that the5th estate is necessary
to monitor the 4th estate. 13 Ironically, if the 4th estate were doing a better job, the need for and
role of the 5th estate in this regard would be reduced, but its broader role in democratic
discourse would continue.
This is the view that McChesney and Nichols take. They point out that the ratio of
opinion to fact in the media of the 5th estate is much higher than the 4th estate. Few resources
are devoted to collecting and reporting news and much of the news that is disseminated has its
origin in the work of the 4th estate. After discussing the crisis of the 4th estate in the implosion
of the consolidated, industrial business model of the media, McChesney and Nichols devote a
great deal of attention to explaining why the emerging 5th estate is not likely to fulfill the
functions of the dwindling 4th estate. Indeed, without a vigorous 4th estate, the 5th estate can
become an echo chamber in which opinions are never challenged or tested by factual
accounts.
Figure 2 depicts the public sphere along three dimensions. The first is whether the
discourse is private or public. The second is whether the discourse is autonomous (direct) or
mediated. The figure seeks to highlight two changes in the public sphere that are taking place
as a result of spread of digital technologies. First the public sphere has expanded. The ability
of people to engage in autonomous and mediated conversations has increased and the nature
of the mediation has changed, with control located much closer to the speaker. Second, the
primary expansion has come in the area of 5th estate activities. Third, the role of the mass
media has declined much more on a relative basis, but not on an absolute basis.
As described in Figure 2, cyberspace activity is much better suited to fulfilling the 5th
estate functions of participation, which helps to explain why cyberspace is not likely to fulfill
the monitorial function of the 4th estate. Once we recognize the distinction between the 5th
estate and the 4th estate, we resolve apparent conflicts between policies that are intended to
strengthen the 4th estate and policies that strengthen the 5th estate. Policies that enhance the

6

Figure 2: The Expanding Digital Public Sphere and the Need for Policy
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5th estate function do not solve the 4th estate problems. The need to reform the commercial
media, to prevent dominance over the 4th estate functions, and to support public media in
creating an institution that is genuinely devoted to quality journalism remain concerns
because the commercial media are still extremely important in the mediated segment of the
emerging public sphere.
Causes of Market Failure
McChesney and Nichols frame the failure of the market to produce adequate quality
journalism as a market failure that is well recognized in neoclassical economics, an
externalities and public goods problem. Positive externalities are values created by a product
that are difficult for the private producers of those products to capture in a transaction. Since
journalism, accountability, and the general consciousness of accurate information are all
benefits to society that cannot be captured or monetized, the private sector does not invest
sufficiently to produce them and society is denied their value. Good government is such a
value. Public goods have unique characteristics that make them unlikely to be produced by
the private sector in sufficient amounts. They are non-rival; the fact that one person enjoys
the good does not mean that a second person is denied the benefits of the good means that
they are produced (i.e. they are not “scarce” in the classic economic sense). They are also
non-excludable; it is difficult to deliver the benefit to one person and exclude others from
enjoying the benefits as well (i.e. they suffer from a free rider problem).
The analysis of market failure need not rest on externalities/public goods alone,
however. McChesney and Nichols add a structural element to their framework. The industry
became highly concentrated and vertically integrated, which led to a dramatic reduction in
competition. Excused from competition, the industry is less responsive to consumer demand
and used its market power to influence demand, failed to innovate and dissipated economic
rents in inefficient and socially unproductive ways. The monopoly and oligopoly situation
created perverse incentives to squeeze profits by cutting quality rather than investing in
productivity. 14
Figure 3 summarizes a comprehensive framework of market failure based on a broader
critique of market fundamentalism. The critique of neoclassical economic theory on which it
rests identifies five broad categories of market failure. 15 We can find examples of market
failure that afflict the 20th century model of concentrated commercial, corporate mass media
in each of these categories:
Societal Failures
Structural Flaws
Endemic Problems
Transaction costs
Behavioral problems

Externalities/Public Goods
Concentration/High short term profit demands
Conflicts of interest, Perverse incentives
High costs of physical distribution
Misperception of value of civic discourse

The power that media concentration confers on owners and the perverse incentive that
advertising introduces into the selection of content have long been identified as problems in
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SOCIETAL FLAWS
Externalities:
ICE problems
Price discrimination
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Bargaining
General Purpose Technology
Producer surplus
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Network Effects
Direct
User
Nonuser
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TRANSACTION COST
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Organizational
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ENDEMIC IMPERFECTIONS
Capital
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Moral Hazard

BEHAVIORAL FACTORS
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Preference
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Prospect
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Status Quo
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Attention
Low priority
Calculation
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Figure 3: A Comprehensive Framework for Identifying Causes of Market Failure
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the media sector. 16 There is strong support in the mainstream literature on media market
performance for the proposition that specific groups (minorities, small groups, small places)
will be systematically underserved, even by “efficient” markets, 17 where there are high fixed
costs. This is exactly the problem of centralized commercial mass media which exhibits high
transaction and production costs. Contemporary analysis has gone even further in the analysis
of bias. It turns out that competition is no guarantee of good performance, since commercial
interests have a perverse incentive (from the point of view of quality journalism) to pander,
rather than inform. 18 Finally, consumers may not value civic content.
EMPIRICAL ADDITIONS
Failure to Meet Society’s Needs for a Vibrant 4th Estate
How many journalists do we need? How much journalism does society want? Why is
the amount we have of each not enough? The answers to these questions are highly
subjective. For the purposes of this analysis, we examine the trends of resources devoted to
journalism across time, compared to the task that journalism faces as the 4th estate. 19 Starting
from the monitorial view of quality journalism, we suggest that the magnitude of the task
facing journalism reflects more than just the size of the population that has to be reached,
which was the primary measure used by McChesney and Nichols, but also its diversity. More
importantly, the 4th estate must cover corporations, the economy and government, all of which
have grown more rapidly than the population. Therefore, we propose a number of measures of
the activity in those arenas that suggest that the task has grown much more rapidly and
expansively than a simple calculation of journalists per capita. We have calculated the ratio of
the number of journalists to the activity they must cover and the audience they must reach
Population Diversity
Using 1970 as the base year, we find a massive under-investment in journalism (see
Figure 4). The number of journalists did not grow anywhere nearly as quickly as the size and
complexity of the audience they had to reach or the issues they had to cover. McChesney and
Nichols measured the number of journalists per capita starting in 1980 and found a sharp
decline. By moving the starting point back a decade, we find that there had been growth
between 1970 and 1980, so the number of journalists compared to the size of the population
was about the same at the beginning of the period (1970) as at the end (2010). However,
when we factor in the growing diversity of the population, we find a much bigger challenge,
relative to the U.S. population, than McChesney and Nichols did. The U.S. population was
much more homogeneous in 1970 than 2010, both in terms of its ethnic makeup and the
household arrangements in which people lived. 20
Activity to be Monitored
When we approach the issue from the perspective of the activities that journalists must
cover, the deficit become even greater. The amount of activity has changed even more
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Figure 4: Ratio of Journalists to Population
Index 1970 = 1
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Source: Statistical Abstract, various issues: 2009, 0065amples, Table 8 and 58.

dramatically than the audience (see Figure 5). The number of corporations doubled compared
to the number of journalists and their size increased fivefold. Foreign ownership increased 25
fold.
Figure 5: Ratio of Journalists to Corporate Activity (Real Values)
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We observe similar levels of expansion in the economy and the economic assets of
households (see Figure 6). Ironically, the growth of government measured by the work force,
about which there is so much complaining, was somewhat slower than the growth of
economic activity (see Figure 7). Nevertheless, measured by the size of federal, state and
local budgets, the number of journalists declined. It should be noted here that our index is
based on the total number of journalists, not those assigned to cover governmental activities.
The share of statehouse reporters declined over the period, so the deficit in coverage was even
greater than these figures indicate. 21
Figure 6: Ratio of Journalists to Economic Activity (Real Values)
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Figure 7: Journalists to Government Activity
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Misuse of Revenue
Shifting the base to 1970 helps to make another point (see Figure 8). The failure to
add journalists to keep pace with the expanding challenge of coverage was not for lack of
resources. The commercial model took profits out rather than reinvest in journalism. As
shown in Figure 8, advertising revenue net of circulation costs, a good measure of resources
that could have been devoted to beefing up newsrooms, increased dramatically from 1970
through 2000, faster than Gross Domestic Product. If the newspapers had increased the
number of journalists at the same rate as their advertising revenue was increasing there would
have been twice as many journalists (120,000 compared to 60,000). If they had increased
only as fast as GDP, there would have been 50 percent more journalists (90,000 compared to
60,000). The deficit in reportorial resources would have been much smaller. Thus, shifting
the time frame underscores the fact that during times of economic boom the corporate model
in journalism failed to devote the resources necessary to maintain the base of journalism. The
key implication is that even restoring the resource base will not solve the problem. Moreover,
as we explain below, the commercial model is not likely to restore the resource base.
Therefore, providing a vigorous 4th estate requires a fundamental shift in approach.
Figure 8: Trends in Print Ad Revenue, GDP and Print Journalists
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Failure to Fulfill Society’s Wants
The declining ability of the concentrated commercial business model to fulfill the 4th
estate function was driven in part by the pursuit of audiences, which lies at the core of the
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commercial model. The profit taken out of the enterprise retarded the investment in quality
journalism. The problem is magnified from the point of view of democratic discourse
because the resources left in journalism were misdirected. The media does not serve the
needs of all members of society equally; it serves the members of the audience most valued
by the advertisers best and delivers the content that the advertisers think will generate sales.
Certain types of coverage (hard news) do not attract the audiences that the advertisers want.
Figure 9 demonstrates this proposition for the issue that is most central to this analysis
Figure 9: The Gap Between Social Value and Commercial Value of Civic Discourse
Civic Engagement (Voter Turnout) v. Advertiser Interest
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– civic participation. The half of the population that is most engaged civically, as measured
by its voter turnout, is severely undervalued by the advertisers. The population groups that are
most avid followers of news are not those most highly prized by advertisers.
Figure 10:
Inadequate Coverage of Issues
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Source: Pew Internet and American Life (Understanding the Participatory News Consumer, March 1,
2010)

To make matter worse, the media not only targets a specific subgroup of the
population that advertisers value, but it does so with particular types of programming -mainly sports – that target the males in the most valued age groups (see Figure 10). A third or
more of the respondents to a large poll on news said there was not enough coverage of a
number of topics, including international news, domestic policy, state government and the
local community. If advertisers undervalue both the people and types of content that are most
vital to civic discourse, then commercial media will never fill the need of society for quality
journalism.
Launching the analysis from the functioning of the polity points to another source of
concern brought out by this data. Between one-third and four-fifths of the people do not turn
out to vote and between one-quarter and two-thirds are not avid news followers. While it can
be argued that society does not need more of its citizens to be engaged, it is at least as
plausible that the lack of engagement is a behavioral source of market failure. Assuming that
the group that values civic discourse most is the best we can hope for, we can identify two
sources of deficit in the valuation of civic discourse (as shown in Figure 11). The gap
between 100 percent and the percent in the highest group can be considered the externality or
public good gap. The gap between the “best” group in society and the rest of society can be
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considered the perception problem. Both of the gaps are substantial. Each requires a different
policy to remedy the problem.
Figure 11: Two Deficits in the Valuation of Civic Discourse

Externality/public good

Perception
Perception

Source: See Figure 9.

DIGITAL DISINTERMEDIATION AND THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM
The previous discussion explored aspects of the failure of the commercial mass media
business model to produce quality journalism, which includes one key cause of the economic
decline – deterioration of quality due to downsizing of the journalistic core. The recent
precipitous decline in newspaper revenues stems from a different source. In order to
understand the current crisis and potential solutions it is critical to have a clear picture of
exactly what is occurring.
Digital disintermediation – the process of removing or weakening the intermediaries
that stand between the creation of content and the delivery of content to the public -- is
frequently “blamed “for the decline of the media. While there are some respects in which this
is true, the popular framing of the proposition misses the most important point: that
inefficiency, not piracy, has undermined the concentrated, commercial model. Digital
disintermediation has different effects on different aspects of the journalism and media space.
It dramatically weakens the commercial mass media business model, the focal point of the 4th
estate in the 20th century, while strengthening and facilitating citizen participation in the 5th
estate, the focal point of the 21st century. The question is how to solve the problems of the 4th
estate 22 while encouraging the positive outcomes of the newly empowered 5th estate.
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The digital revolution is having two profound effects on the commercial mass media.
First, the intermediary role that the commercial enterprises play -- creating an audience to sell
to advertisers – is being undercut because the production and distribution of physical goods to
disseminate content (newspapers, books, music CDs, broadcast stations, cable systems) are
expensive ways to create audiences. The Internet makes it possible to aggregate audiences in
much less costly ways that do not require a newspaper, book publisher, music label or
broadcaster. Second, the cost of producing content has also reduced.
Figure 12 shows that in the three sectors where digital disintermediation has had the
greatest impact – music, newspapers and book publishing – the commercial mass media
model was dominated by activities other than the creation of content. Content creators
account for only 15 cents of every dollar that a consumer pays to receive content from a
commercial media company. The physical medium and physical distribution represent about
half of the total cost of the product. These costs can be largely eliminated. Running a huge
commercial enterprise to produce and distribute the physical products is costly as well. These
costs can be reduced with the use of digital technologies, as can advertising and marketing
costs.
Figure 12: Shares in Purchase Price of Information Goods
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The audience-creating aspect of digital disintermediation is most evident in the
newspaper sector. As shown in Figure 13, the primary source of lost revenue in the past
decade is in classified advertising, which accounts for about 60 percent of the loss. Classified
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advertising is an appendage to the newspaper – usually contained in a separate section – and
advertisers pay to be there because they think there will be an audience and they hope people
who are looking for something will go there, even though they have to acquire so much
“extraneous” material. One can argue that the bundling is efficient in physical space, since it
spreads the fixed cost of distribution across a number of products (news, sports, funnies,
classified, movie listings, etc.) Once the Internet became ubiquitous, specialized classified
service providers (e.g. Craig’s List), employment lists (Monster.com), and electronic twosided markets providers (e.g. E-bay) became more attractive. Bundling not only loses its
value, it becomes a hindrance (too much noise and low probability of effectiveness).
Figure 13: Newspaper Sources of Ad Revenue
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The ability to target advertising is also important. The success of local cable and
weekly advertising has probably accounted for part of the revenue loss in the retail category.
Newspapers are forced to shrink their service areas as they can no longer compete with the
more efficient alternatives.
Digital distribution is not succeeding because it is stealing the content of the
commercial mass media; it is succeeding because it is a much more efficient mechanism for
aggregating audiences and distributing information. Because it is so efficient, the future
media will not support the massive commercial enterprises that came to dominate the mass
media in the 20th century. Since these losses are based on efficiency and competition, there is
no reason to believe that they will be restored, nor is there any reason to believe that policy
should be implemented to “save” the commercial mass media enterprises, as an economic
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proposition. This does not mean, though, that there cannot be a large and effective 4th estate.
It does mean that the 4th estate will have to be focused more on content producers than
intermediary corporations, and likely require more public support. Because the cost of
producing and distributing content is so much lower, the possibility of designing sustainable
public support mechanisms is greater.
Figure 14 integrates the conceptual and empirical analyses using the misfit between
avid readers and advertiser valued audiences as the base. Each of the market imperfections
drives the market farther from the optimum level of output of quality journalism, resulting in
a massive and pervasive market failure. As depicted in Figure 14, the commercial mass media
business model is responsible for the bulk of the market failure (externalities, perverse
incentives and high cost). The dramatic reduction in costs associated with digital
disintermediation potentially addresses one of the market imperfections, the cost issue, but not
the perverse incentives or externalities problems. These are inherent in the commercial base
of the model.
POLICY CHALLENGES
Confronted with a major crisis and change in an industry, there are two avenues of
policy analysis one must consider. First, policies that do not make sense should be resisted.
Second, policies to drive change in the direction that promotes the public interest should be
identified.
Bailing out a Failing Industry will not Solve the Problem
When an industry is dying under the weight of technological change and new
competitive business models, the worst thing public policy can do is allow it to leverage the
vestiges of its franchise or invoke some claim to special status to retard the progress of
technology or impede the growth of competition.
Public policy has struggled to preserve a modicum of competition in the newspaper
industry by suspending the strictures of antitrust law for almost 35 years to no avail. The
purpose of antitrust is to preserve competition, not obsolete business models. For much of
that time, there was not a genuine prospect of an alternative. Today there is. The Internet and
the digital revolution have opened the door to a vast array of competitors to the dominant
newspaper model.
For newspapers the costs of content production are a small percentage of the total
costs of the physical production and distribution of news – recent analyses indicate as little as
15% of total costs. As these physical costs are shed, there is no reason to assume that a viable
stream of income composed of a mix of subscription and advertising revenue large enough to
support the newsroom cannot be created. There is also no reason to assume the underlying
market failures that lead the underproduction of quality journalism will be corrected in the
commercial space.
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Figure 14: Sources of the Deficit of Quality Journalism

Much of the journalism we lament losing is not local, but statewide, regional, national
and international. If an issue is not inherently local, such as a school board election, it will
have difficulty commanding resources in the local media because “outsiders” can now use
digital distribution to aggregate a larger audience. Local papers will simply not be able to
compete in reporting on global, national or statewide issues and they have begun to outsource
that function. Small-town newspapers should be able to survive even in the digital age
because they serve inherently local markets that attract fewer competing media services.
However, local papers will simply not be able to compete in reporting on global, national or
statewide issues and they will have to adapt their business model to the new environment.
A few national/global newsgathering wire services, newspapers and major broadcasters
should weather the economic downturn -- albeit with fewer quality journalists -- since nobody
else will meet consumer demand for such information.
Newspapers in medium to large cities that historically covered local, statewide,
regional, national and some global news are in the worst shape because the new environment
impacts their business model most. In the digital age, they probably cannot maintain adequate
advertising revenue -- losing ground to cable and web-based alternatives to classified ads -- to
sustain adequate investment in such broad-based reporting. They lose competitively in the
national and global markets to the big national newspapers and wire services and lose local
advertising revenue to competing media.
While antitrust cannot solve the problem of the newspaper industry, there are three
critical errors that antitrust policy must avoid.
First, newspapers and TV stations, which do not compete in physical space, do
compete in cyberspace, using their physical space brands to generate huge flows of traffic to
their web sites. This nascent competition should be preserved. Newspaper TV cross
ownership should not be allowed.
Second, efforts to form cartels to control the pricing of the distribution of digital
content, advocated under a theory of destructive competition (i.e. as long as anyone gives
content away for free no one can charge for it) should be rejected. If, indeed, there is a
market failure in the distribution of digital content, a private cartel is not the solution. A
compulsory licensing scheme that provides a stream of income but prevents anticompetitive
and antidemocratic restraints of the flow of information is preferable.
Third, to the extent that competition persists in physical space, it is between dailies
and weeklies and other forms of physical, specialized press (e.g. ethnic media). Given the
collapse of the daily newspaper business model in large metropolitan areas, it will be difficult
to oppose consolidation in that product space, but that does not mean antitrust authorities
should turn a blind eye toward the capture of competing physical space products or business
practices that are intended to weaken competition from these physical space alternatives.
Acquisition of weeklies and practices that attempt to squeeze competition by bundling
advertising in dailies and weeklies should be frowned upon. (Small town newspapers are not
suffering nearly as much as large metro newspapers, but they are already invariably
monopolies and entry into this space is highly unlikely)
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The correct antitrust attitude is to protect competition where it is viable in the long
term. The claim that we should deviate from that path to preserve the social value of
newspapers is dubious at best. The claim that we must preserve the dying business model
because it performs an important social function is neither an antitrust issue, nor is it very
compelling. When was the golden age of newspapers as the fourth estate in the era of the
industrial, commercial mass media? The examples of real investigative print journalism
making a difference are few and far between. A camera capturing the word “macaca” or a
well-crafted satire replayed millions of time on the Internet can have as much impact as an
army of investigative journalists. The alternative media are certainly immature as a fourth
estate, but the bar has been set so low by the sorry record of the commercial mass media in
the past several decades and the new public sphere is brimming with such activity and
experimentation, that there is little reason to believe that it will not fulfill the fourth estate
function in a superior manner.
Alternative Media can provide Building Blocks, but Public Resources Are Necessary
The commercial newspaper market in the 21st century media environment leaves
substantial gaps in coverage that would never have been filled by the commercial model. The
same technology that is undermining that model create opportunities for new models of
journalism, which may evolve to support journalists, but it remains to be seen whether it can
evolve into the institution of journalism that society needs.
The digital age has witnessed an explosion of alternative media and citizen expression
that did not exist in the 20th century age of mass media. Whether this expression is or can
become the sort of journalism that provides the public good remains to be seen and how the
new media can be made to support good journalism requires new business models.
The question is “can new media become a trusted intermediary that engages in good
journalism with the resources necessary to fulfill journalism’s function?” One critical
challenge is to figure out how to tap into the immense energy of the public sphere in
cyberspace while preserving key journalistic attributes someplace within a much-expanded
public sphere.
Some important examples to consider include –
Informational Text: Is Wikipedia an encyclopedia? If not, what would it take to
make it one? How much editorial control could be applied without destroying the wiki
essence? What models of editorial oversight best balance the goal of quality content and
democratic input (lieutenants, councils, member rankings, member voting)?
Online Posts: Online posts began as pure opinion pages (e.g. Huffington) but they
have started to take root, add reporters and start doing investigative journalism. They are
supported by online advertising. Some bring substantial expertise and develop aspects of
reporting that exist in the traditional media but can be highly developed in digital applications
(e.g. 538). They tend to have political leanings, which cause the professional school of
journalism heartburn, but the commercial mass media have suffered from a pervasive bias
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problem itself. While many of the posts have strong identifications across the political some
are largely informational and quite expert.
Books: Publishing in the digital environment is changing rapidly. Rejected authors
build audiences on line and get contract from the publishers who rejected them. Publishers
now make all or part of their works available at no charge online and have agreed to allow
them to be scanned and searched. Whole new forms of copyright are being developed.
Music: There are seven million bands on Myspace and virtually none have a contract
with a record label, but they sell billions of songs online. They are certainly musicians, but
are they professional musicians? Does it matter? Can they support themselves as musicians,
probably not, but what would it take to deepen the model so that they can and could it spread
to other forms of information and cultural content production?
Open Source: Open source software has produced large quantities of high quality
product; some believe higher quality than commercial software. Labor is contributed and
supported by commercial entities that have a need for the product (not unlike aggregators who
need good journalistic content). Decision making management structures have been created
to promote progress toward completion of tasks. Group processes determine critical tasks and
screen acceptable solutions, not unlike the functions of editorial boards and editors.
Crowd Sourcing: One of the lessons being taken (and debated) from the past election
is the ability of semi-organized crowds (truth squads) to respond to negative advertising and
smear campaigns. The impact of poor quality content was reduced (it can never be
eliminated) dramatically because of the speed and scope of the ability to respond.
Nonprofit information models: Consumer Reports, fearing a declining revenue
stream from print publishing, has transformed itself into a hugely successful mass online
subscription business. It has a trusted brand to build on, but there is no reason that other
nonprofit brands cannot be built in cyberspace to support subscription models. Commercial
news outlets have begun to rely on noncommercial services that produce and distribute news
relying on low cost digital communications.
These are just a glimpse of the alternative approaches to content creation and
distribution that are bubbling in the digital public sphere. They are chosen to show the great
diversity of approaches that has flowered in cyberspace. The various characteristics will
likely be mixed and matched in the search for long term viability. Professional and citizen
journalists already mix; what the proportion that creates a durable new journalism will be
remains to be seen.
The cacophony of the blogosphere is dizzying and overwhelmingly opinion, which
must be counted as an improvement over a public sphere dominated by corporate media. To
build trust the new journalism will have to produce a steady stream of output that readers find
authoritative, correct and useful. To ensure the quality of output, they will need to routinize
the roles of reporter and editor and find ways to ensure the reporters and editors have
resources to do their jobs. Traditional media have begun to utilize this communications
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mechanism, with reporters blogging and bloggers reporting on traditional media web sites.
However, it is the independent media that provides the seeds of an alternative journalism.
These tend to be structured viral communications, in which a light touch of hierarchy can go a
long way.
The essential challenge is to map the basic characteristics of journalism – reporting,
editing, and response –into the new media space. Given the poor record of the commercial
mass media, alternative media are almost certain to represent a much greater degree of
gender, race and ethnic diversity. The challenge is to understand the institutional structures
that will allow the emerging alternative media and online models of structured viral
communications to become to trusted intermediaries.
The above models may provide institutions to house journalists and environments in
which good journalism can be produced, but the challenge will remain of directing sufficient
resources to ensure the quantity of good journalism is sufficient to fulfill its public purpose.
There is a structural gap that will not be filled by these models. The proliferation of
competition for advertising does not translate into competition for the production of quality
journalistic content. We will have to look elsewhere for a solution to the underproduction of
quality journalism.
Promoting Quality Journalism
Figure 15 associates the various policies discussed by McChesney and Nichols with
specific market failures. Exhibit 16 identifies the areas of the public sphere that are the
targets of the various policies.
The role of a vigorous public media to provide 4th estate functions is well supported by
this analysis. An expanded public media addresses several of the market failures, more than
any other single alternative.


Public goods (i.e. public media) need to be supported by public funds or
they will be underprovided.



Perverse incentives and conflicts of interest are addressed by public media
both directly and indirectly. Directly the public media produces quality
journalism. Indirectly public media serves as a benchmark by which the
performance of the commercial media can be judged.



Concentration is addressed in part by creating a strong public media
alternative.
Public media does not address all of the market failures.



The various policies that ensure a communications network that is
ubiquitous and open for democratic discourse are justified to support the 5th
estate functions.
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Figure 15:
Differentiating Policy Recommendations by Product and Geographic Markets
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Figure 16: Policies to Strengthen the Public Sphere in the Digital Age
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Uneven distribution of interest in civic discourse and a lack of willingness
to invest in this discourse can be addressed with education.



To the extent that there is an affordability problem for either the 4th or 5th
estate functions, vouchers are an approach that preserves consumer
sovereignty (as opposed to direct subsidies to corporations, which filter the
support through a corporate lens).

Conclusion
The McChesney-Nichols critique of the 20th century model of commercial media has
gained purchase with the economic collapse of the last decade, but the resistance to
meaningful reform is strong, as we have seen in the effort to address pervasive market failures
in health care and financial services. By presenting a broad analysis of the causes of market
failure in this sector, based on the traditional structure, conduct performance paradigm of
industrial organization and the growing critique of neoclassical economics, we hope those
who are open to basing policy on data-driven empirical analysis will be accepting of a more
penetrating account of the death of journalism and open to the substantial shift in policies that
are needed to bring quality journalism back to life in America.
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